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INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of the National Football League
Players‘ Association (NFLPA), collective bargaining in the
National Football League (NFL) has had its fair share of ups
and downs.1 Struggles over free agency, player salaries,
player benefits, and the draft have resulted in multiple work
stoppages.2 One issue at the forefront of collective bargaining
is drug testing, but, unlike free agency and salary caps, the
NFL and the NFLPA agree on their stance: ban the use of
drugs.3 The health effects, public relations, and potential
effect on the integrity of the game have both sides in
accordance that a strict policy is necessary.4 The same
bargaining process that resulted in the NFL‘s Drug Testing
Policy (―the Policy‖), also resulted in successful bargaining
since 1957.5 Although work stoppages did occur in the rich
history of the league, the league ran successfully without any
such stoppage since 1987.6 Instead, the NFL and NFLPA
repeatedly extended their collective bargaining agreements
(CBA) and, with increased pressure from Congress,7 made
1. See generally History, NFLPLAYERS.COM, http://nflpa.com/About-us/History/
(on file with author).
2. See id. at paras. 4, 6–7, 13–19, 22–29; see also Paul D. Staudohar, The Football
Strike of 1987: The Question of Free Agency, 111 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 26, 26–30 (1988).
3. See The NFL StarCaps Case: Are Sports’ Anti-Doping Programs at a Legal
Crossroads?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer
Protection, 111th Cong. 34, 34–40 (2009) [hereinafter NFL Hearing] (testimony of
DeMaurice Smith, Executive Director, National Football League Players Association).
4. NFL & NFLPA, NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE POLICY ON ANABOLIC STEROIDS
AND RELATED SUBSTANCES, § 1 (2007) [hereinafter NFL POLICY].
5. See History, supra note 1, at para. 2.
6. See Michael Wilbon, Possible NFL Lockout in 2011 Is Hot Topic on Eve of Super
Bowl, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/02/05/AR2010020503094.html.
7. In 2005, Congress introduced four bills that would have regulated drug testing
policies in sports. See generally Office of National Drug Control Reauthorization Act,
H.R. 2565, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005); Clean Sports Act of 2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2005); Professional Sports Integrity Act of 2005, H.R. 2516, 109th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2005); Drug Free Sports Act, H.R. 1862, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005). In
proposing these bills, Congress did not mean to regulate drug testing, but rather meant
to encourage the leagues to have more stringent penalties in their drug testing policies.
See Hal Bodley, MLB Strikes Out Fines from Steroid Policies, USA TODAY, Mar. 21,
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changes to the Policy that reflects the increased need to test
players.8
On September 11, 2009, however, the Eighth Circuit‘s
decision in Williams v. National Football League placed the
process of collective bargaining at risk.9 The Eighth Circuit,
in affirming the District Court for the District of Minnesota,
found that the players‘ statutory claims were not preempted
under section 301 of the Labor Management Relation Act
(LMRA).10 This decision effectively told the NFL and NFLPA
that the bargaining process that resulted in over fifty years of
successful CBAs and over twenty years of uninterrupted
football was tainted. The Eighth Circuit ignored the intent of
Congress and the judicial impetus of section 301 preemption,
putting the future of collective bargaining in professional
sports in jeopardy. On May 13, 2010, the NFL petitioned the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari looking for a resolution
of the issues surrounding interpretation of section 301 of the
LMRA.11 On November 8, 2010, the Supreme Court denied
the petition, avoiding resolution of the section 301 circuit
split, and allowing the process of collective bargaining to
remain at risk.12 On the heels of the Eighth Circuit‘s decision,
and reflective of the concerns surrounding the Eighth
Circuit‘s decision, the NFL entered its first work stoppage in
almost twenty-five years, unable to agree on a new CBA.13
This Comment will discuss the effect preemption has on
state law claims regarding drug testing policies implemented
in professional sports—focusing on section 301 of the LMRA—
using Williams v. National Football League as a case study.
Part I will introduce the federal preemption doctrines as well
as the preemption corollaries specific to labor law. Part II
will present the background of the Eighth Circuit‘s decision in
2005, at C1; Steroid Penalties Much Tougher with Agreement, ESPN (Nov. 15, 2005,
11:29PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2224832.
8. See Vinny DiTrani, NFL Deal Done; Owners Accept NFLPA Offer, RECORD,
Mar. 9, 2006, at S01; see also Mark Maske & Leonard Shapiro, NFL Strengthens
Steroid Policy, WASH. POST, April 27, 2005 at D08, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/04/26/AR2005042601232.html.
9. 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 566 (2010).
10. See id. at 878–80.
11. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Nat‘l Football League v. Williams,
131 S. Ct. 566 (2010) (No. 09-1380), 2010 WL 1932622.
12. See Williams, 131 S. Ct. 566, denying cert. to, 582 F.3d 863.
13. Judge Backs Injunction to Halt NFL Lockout, Post to Yahoo! News, YAHOO!
(Apr. 25, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20110425/sp_nm/us_nfl_dispute_3.
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Williams v. National Football League. Part III will analyze
the NFL‘s drug testing policy as well as the two Minnesota
state statutes at issue in the Williams case. Part IV will
discuss the ways in which the Eighth Circuit erred in its
decision and the reasons why the state statutes at issue
should have been preempted. Furthermore, Part IV will
discuss how the Eighth Circuit‘s decision effectively removed
arbitrators from their role in the resolution of labor disputes.
Part V will seek to reestablish the role of arbitrators by
arguing that unions should be able to waive the judicial forum
in favor of arbitration for state statutory claims, using the
2009 decision of 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett14 as the basis for such
a judicial waiver.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. Preemption Doctrines Generally
The Constitution seeks to strike a balance between state
and federal interests by granting certain powers and rights to
the federal government,15 limiting the state‘s power in certain
circumstances16 and reserving the state‘s power in others.17
Although states maintain certain powers, federal interests
are given an overarching reach, as evidenced by the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.18 The Supremacy
Clause, which has been the foundation of many doctrinal
findings of the judiciary,19 including preemption, states: ―This
14. 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
15. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The clauses most pertinent to this
discussion are the Commerce Clause, compelling Congress, ―[t]o regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes[,]‖ id. at
art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, allowing Congress, ―[t]o make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the
United States, or in any department or officer thereof.‖ Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
16. See id. at art. I, § 10. This section prohibits the states from, among other
things, ―enter[ing] into any treaty, alliance, or confederation . . . ; without the consent of
the Congress, [from] lay[ing] any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what
may be absolutely necessary for executing it‘s inspection law . . . [; and] keep[ing]
troops, or ships of war in time of peace[.]‖ Id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 1–3.
17. See id. at amend. X. The Reserve Clause states that, ―[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.‖ Id.
18. See id. at art. VI, cl. 2.
19. The Dormant Commerce Clause is a doctrine of judicial interpretation, finding
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Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .‖20
In turn, courts have recognized three types of preemption:
express, field, and conflict.21 Because Congress has no
authority to pass laws outside of its constitutionally vested
power, a finding of preemption presupposes that Congress
acted within its proper scope.22 Express preemption occurs
when Congress, enacts legislation that—through the
legislation‘s plain language—specifically prohibits states from
acting.23 Field preemption occurs when Congress acts with
the intent to occupy an entire field, and state law
impermissibly regulates within that field.24 Lastly, conflict
preemption occurs when: (i) it is impossible to comply with
both the state and federal law,25 or (ii) the state law frustrates
congressional intent or ―stands as an obstacle to [its]
accomplishment.‖26 Although all three doctrines contain
different means for evaluation, the main objective of the
preemption doctrine is to determine congressional intent.27
Ultimately, if a conflict exists between a federal interest or
law and a state law, the state law will be ―preempted,‖
meaning it cannot be maintained due to the risk of frustrating
congressional intent.28
B. Labor Law and Preemption
In labor law, the Supreme Court has identified three
state laws that discriminate against out-of-state entities, or significantly burden the
flow of interstate commerce, invalid. See Amy M. Petragnani, The Dormant Commerce
Clause: On Its Last Leg, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1215, 1216–19 (1994).
20. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
21. Stephen F. Befort & Byran N. Smith, At the Cutting Edge of Labor Law
Preemption: A Critique of Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 20 LAB. LAW. 107, 109
(2004); Mary J. Davis, On Preemption, Congressional Intent, and Conflicts of Laws, 66
U. PITT. L. REV. 181, 198–99 (2004).
22. See Davis, supra note 21, at 182.
23. Befort & Smith, supra note 21, at 109; see also Davis, supra note 21, at 198–99.
24. See Befort & Smith, supra note 21, at 109; see also Davis, supra note 21, at 199.
25. Befort & Smith, supra note 21, at 109; Davis, supra note 21, at 199.
26. Davis, supra note 21, at 199 (citing Hillsborough Cnty v. Automated Med.
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712–13 (1985)).
27. See Befort & Smith, supra note 21, at 109–10; see also Davis, supra note 21, at
183.
28. See Befort & Smith, supra note 21, at 109.
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strands of preemption, all practical examples of field
preemption:29 Garmon preemption,30 Machinists preemption,31
and section 301 preemption.32 These doctrines all derive from
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and, in inferring
congressional intent, seek to preclude state actions where the
federal scheme should control.33
1. Garmon Preemption
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, the
Supreme Court sought to answer the question whether a state
court, having no jurisdiction to enjoin peaceful union activity,
could award damages arising out of the same activity.34 After
the employer failed to agree to retain only union members,
the union in Garmon picketed for the purpose of encouraging
union participation.35 The Superior Court for the County of
San Diego (―California court‖) enjoined the picketing and
awarded damages.36 The Supreme Court found that the state
court could not enjoin the action, even if the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) declined jurisdiction.37 On remand,
the California court upheld the damages, while setting aside
the injunction.38 In finding the California court‘s issuance of
damages inappropriate,39 the Supreme Court held, ―[w]hen an
activity is arguably subject to [section] 7 or [section] 8 of the
[NLRA], the States as well as the federal courts must defer to
the exclusive competence of the [NLRB] if the danger of state
interference with national policy is to be averted.‖40 Thus, the
California courts could not award damages arising from
activity the court had no jurisdiction to enjoin in the first
29. See Henry H. Drummonds, Reforming Labor Law by Reforming Labor Law
Preemption Doctrine to Allow the States to Make More Labor Relations Policy, 70 LA. L.
REV. 97, 164 (2009).
30. See generally San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
31. See generally Lodge 76, Int‘l Ass‘n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis.
Emp‘t Relations Comm‘n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
32. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185
(2006); see also Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
33. See Befort & Smith, supra note 21, at 109–10.
34. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 239.
35. Id. at 237.
36. Id. at 237–38.
37. Id. at 238.
38. Id. at 239.
39. Id. at 248.
40. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245 (emphasis added).
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place. In holding so, the Court reiterated two important
exceptions to this area of preemption: (1) ―Where the
regulated conduct touch[s] interests [] deeply rooted in local
feeling and responsibility,‖41 and (2) ―where the activity
regulated [is] a merely peripheral concern of the [LMRA],‖ the
state court may act.42
2. Machinists Preemption
In Lodge 76, International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, the
court sets forth the second strand of labor law preemption.43
Machinists involved a union‘s refusal to have employees work
overtime after the employer unilaterally imposed longer
hours.44 The employer filed a charge with both the NLRB and
the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC).45
The Regional Director of the NLRB dismissed the unfair labor
practices charge, finding the union was not in violation of the
NLRA.46 The WERC then tried the case and found the union‘s
action an unfair labor practice and ordered the union to cease
and desist.47 In finding the WERC‘s decision preempted,48 the
Supreme Court held that preemption depends upon whether
Congress wanted the conduct to be unregulated, or, ―to be
controlled by the free play of economic forces.‖49 This inquiry
derives from the belief that a certain activity may be
―protected‖ when it is ―intended to be ‗unrestricted by [a]ny
governmental power to regulate‘ because it was among the
permissible ‗economic weapons in reserve . . . .‘‖50

41. Id. at 244 (alteration in original).
42. Id. at 243 (alteration in original) (citing Int‘l Ass‘n of Machinists v. Gonzales,
356 U.S. 617 (1958)).
43. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
44. Id. at 134.
45. Id. at 135.
46. Id. at 135–36.
47. Id. at 136.
48. Id. at 155.
49. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. at 140 (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch
Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)).
50. Id. at 141 (emphasis added) (quoting NLRB v. Ins. Agents‘ Int‘l Union, 361 U.S.
477, 488–89 (1960)).
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3. Section 301 Preemption
The third strand of labor preemption derives from section
301 of the LMRA.51 Section 301 states:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.52

Section 301 compels the use of federal laws to ensure the
uniform interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.53
When negotiating, the fear of state action places an
unreasonably high burden on the negotiating parties to
formulate an agreement that complies with every possible
state law.54 Although section 301 recognizes the problems
associated with conflicting state laws and encourages
collective bargaining, Congress intended for parties to freely
bargain only within the basic constraints of state law.55 Thus,
subject to section 301 preemption, parties cannot agree to
provisions that would be illegal under state law.56
In
balancing the sometimes-conflicting interests of collective
bargaining and state rights, the test for section 301
preemption has been developed to consist of two separate
prongs.57 First, a state-law claim is preempted if the claim
itself is based on a violation of a specific term of the CBA.58
As an example, this would encompass breach of contract
claims. Second, a state law claim is preempted by section 301
if the claim ―is ‗dependent upon an analysis‘ of the relevant

51. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. §
185(a) (2006); see also Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
52. § 301(a).
53. Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Lucas
Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962).
54. See id. at 103–04.
55. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 395 (1987) (citing Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 212 (1985)).
56. See id. (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 212).
57. Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 874 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing
Bogan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 500 F.3d 828, 832 (8th Cir. 2007)), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
566 (2010).
58. See id.
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CBA‖59 This second prong ultimately means that, ―if the
resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a
[CBA], the application of the state law is preempted and
federal labor law principles—necessarily uniform throughout
the Nation—must be employed to resolve the dispute.‖60
Section 301 has ―extraordinary preemptive power.‖61 It
extends to any claim that finds itself ―inextricably intertwined
with consideration of the terms of the labor contract,‖62 or
―substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an
agreement made between the parties in a labor contract.‖63
Preemption deriving from section 301 of the LMRA recognizes
the unique relationship among bargaining parties and seeks
to foster the relationship by mandating the application of
federal law in the interpretation and enforcement of any
CBA.64
Congress also promulgated section 301 with the intention
of encouraging parties to agree to terms providing for binding
arbitration proceedings.65 Congress codified this intention in
section 203(d) of the LMRA which states: ―Final adjustment
by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to
be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes
arising over the application or interpretation of an existing
[CBA].‖66 Although the decision to agree to arbitration is
completely voluntary, the intent of the parties is binding.67 If
the parties decide to include a provision for grievance
arbitration, and a court finds that a claim is preempted by
section 301, only an agreed upon forum—including the forum
of arbitration—should be used to interpret the CBA.68

59. Id. (quoting Bogan, 500 F.3d at 832).
60. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405–06 (1988).
61. Shane v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 1989); see also
Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 394 (citing Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 88 S. Ct.
1235, 1236 (1968)).
62. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985).
63. Id. at 220.
64. See Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964)) (finding that
claims arising under a collectively bargained for agreement give way to a ‗new common
law‘ of the labor agreement).
65. See Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104–05 (1962).
66. 29 U.S.C. 173(d) (2006)
67. See id.
68. See id.
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II. WILLIAMS V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
On December 2, 2008, six players were suspended from the
NFL for failing a mandatory drug test.69 In response, two
players from the Minnesota Vikings—Pat Williams and Kevin
Williams—appealed their suspensions through the Policymandated grievance procedure.70 After their suspensions
were sustained, the Williamses sued the NFL in a Minnesota
state court, alleging various violations of Minnesota common
law.71 That same day, the court blocked the suspensions and
issued a temporary restraining order.72 The NFL then
removed the case to federal court.73 Once in federal court, the
Williamses amended their complaint, alleging two statutory
claims: (1) violation of Minnesota‘s Drug and Alcohol Testing
in the Workplace Act (DATWA), and (2) violation of
Minnesota‘s Consumable Products Act (CPA).74 In response,
the NFL filed a motion for summary judgment.75 The district
court granted the NFL‘s summary judgment motion in part—
finding the Williamses‘ common law claims preempted by
section 301 of the LMRA—and denied the motion in part—
remanding the statutory claims to state court.76 The Eighth
Circuit affirmed the totality of the district court‘s decision.77
In doing so, the Eighth Circuit found that adjudication of the
statutory claims did not require interpretation of the CBA;
instead, the claims were independent of the CBA and thus not
preempted by section 301 of the LMRA.78 The court did hold,
however, that the state common law claims were preempted
because those claims depended upon interpretation of the
CBA.79
69. Saints McAllister, Vikings’ Williamses Among Suspended, ESPN (Dec. 3, 2008,
3:36 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3740122.
70. See Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 566 (2010).
71. Id. at 871–72.
72. Id. at 872.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 872.
76. Williams, 582 F.3d at 872–73.
77. Id. at 886.
78. See id. at 878, 880.
79. See id. at 881–82.
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A. State Statutory Claims
The Eighth Circuit explicitly found that an employee‘s
mere membership in an entity governed by a CBA does not
insulate the employer from state statutory claims.80 Most
notably, the court held
[W]here there is a CBA that is at least as protective of employees
as [the] DATWA, the number of possible claims an employee has
against his or her employer will be affected. Where the employer
complies with [the] DATWA but not with its CBA that provides
greater protection, the employee could have [sic] only a claim for
breach of contract. Where the employer does not comply either
with [the] DATWA or its CBA that provides equivalent or greater
protection than [the] DATWA, the employee could potentially have
two claims, a claim for breach of contract and a DATWA claim. 81

The NFL made three arguments regarding Minnesota‘s
DATWA: (1) The claim turns on analysis of the Policy to find
out whether it ―meets or exceeds‖ the statutory requirements;
(2) the claim requires interpretation of the Policy to find out if
the NFL qualifies as an employer; and (3) uniform
interpretation of the Policy is necessary to preserve the
integrity of the game.82
While comparing the Williams facts against the facts in
Karnes v. Boeing Co.,83 the court held that determining
whether the NFL‘s policy was at least as protective as the
DATWA was a factual dispute, which the court believed it
could not preempt under section 301.84 In Karnes, an
employee brought an action against his employer for firing
him in violation of Oklahoma‘s Standards for Workplace Drug
and Alcohol Testing Act (OSWDATA).85 The court noted that
the OSWDATA said that ―[n]o disciplinary action, except for a
temporary suspension or a temporary transfer to another
position, may be taken by an employer against an employee
based on a positive test result unless the test result has been
confirmed by a second test.‖86 In Williams, the court noted
80. See id. at 875.
81. Id.
82. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 873.
83. 335 F.3d 1189 (10th Cir. 2003).
84. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 876 (citing Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S.
246, 261, 266 (1994)).
85. See Karnes, 335 F.3d at 1192.
86. See id. at 1193 (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 562(A) (2010)).
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that the plaintiff in Karnes merely needed to show that
―Boeing (1) discharged him based on his drug test, and (2)
failed to confirm the results through a second test.‖87 The
court determined that both of these findings were merely
factual and did not require interpretation of the CBA. As a
result, the Williams court held that the Williamses‘—as the
court saw it comparable—claims were not preempted under
section 301 of the LMRA.88
The Williams court also determined that it simply needed
to reference the CBA in order to define ―employer‖ instead of
actually interpreting or analyzing the agreement.89 The
Williams court—consistent with previous case law on section
301—noted that preemption occurs only where interpretation
of a CBA is necessary.90 Therefore, courts have been quick to
distinguish cases ―which require interpretation or
construction of the CBA from those which only require
reference to it.‖91 The Eighth Circuit asserted that resolution
of the DATWA claim merely required reference to the
preamble.92 Specifically, the court noted that the players
accept employment by a member club of the NFL, which
cannot create a preemptive effect.93 More importantly, the
court also found that the players‘ contracts, which referenced
the NFL‘s employer status, were not a part of the CBA and
thus the issue did not require any interpretation of the CBA.94
Without interpretation of the CBA itself, section 301
preemption was completely improper.95
Finally, the court reasoned that the need for uniform
policies in the NFL could not overwhelm valid state laws and
that the interest itself could not mandate preemption.96 By
analogizing Williams to Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways,
Inc.,97 the Eighth Circuit rejected preemption.98 In Cramer,
87. Williams, 582 F.3d at 876 (quoting Karnes, 335 F.3d at 1193).
88. See id.
89. See id. (citing Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124–25 (1994)).
90. See id.
91. Id. (quoting Trs. of Twin City Bricklayers Fringe Benefit Funds v. Superior
Waterproofing, Inc., 450 F.3d 324, 330 (2006)).
92. See id. at 877.
93. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 877.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 876–77.
96. See id. at 877–78.
97. 255 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2001).
98. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 877–78.
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the employer argued that the CBA should ―supersede
inconsistent state laws.‖99 The court rejected the employer‘s
argument, noting that the ―LMRA certainly did not give
employers and unions the power to displace any state
regulatory law they found inconvenient.‖100 Following the
rationale of the Cramer court, and because the Eighth Circuit
found drug testing policies to be a non-negotiable state right,
it opined that parties could not negotiate for what was illegal
under state laws and held that the DATWA was not
preempted.101
Aside from the DATWA, the NFL also argued that the
CPA claims were preempted under section 301 because: (1)
deciding whether to list bumetanide as a banned substance
qualifies as a bona fide occupational requirement, compelling
interpretation of the CBA, and (2) determining whether the
use was ―off the premises of the employer‖ and during ―nonworking hours‖ requires the state court to analyze the CBA.102
The court rejected these arguments, and in doing so, took an
extremely narrow approach to section 301 preemption.103 The
court opined that it could only look at the claim, and not
toward any affirmative defense, to determine whether section
301 should preempt the claim.104
B. State Common Law Claims
The Eighth Circuit, in upholding the district court, found
that the state common law claims were preempted, unlike the
Williamses‘ statutory claims.105 The court stated that any
claim of duty owed by the NFL depends specifically on ―the
parties‘ legal relationship and expectations as established by
the CBA and the Policy.‖106 In concluding so, the court found
that section 301 preempted the claims of breach of fiduciary
duty, negligence, and gross negligence.107 Regarding the
fraud claims, the court found that reasonable reliance on a
99. 255 F.3d at 695 n.9.
100. Id. (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211–12 (1985)).
101. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 874 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 211–12)
(emphasis added).
102. See id.
103. See id. at 879 n.13.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 883.
106. Id. at 881.
107. Williams, 582 F.3d at 881.
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lack of warning, ―cannot be ascertained apart from the terms
of the Policy.‖108 Finally, regarding the intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim, the court found that ―one can only
evaluate the outrageousness of the NFL‘s conduct . . . in light
of what the parties have agreed to in the Policy.‖109
III. THE NFL POLICY AND THE MINNESOTA STATUTES
A. The NFL’s Drug Testing Policy
In 1989, the NFL and the NFLPA came together and
approved the league‘s first Drug Testing Policy.110 Although it
has changed numerous times,111 the Policy employs rules,
testing procedures, and disciplinary actions, which are
executed when players either fail to follow procedures or fail a
drug test.112 The NFL and NFLPA agreed to the Policy due to
a concern with the players‘ use of prohibited substances.113
There are three factors upon which this concern is founded:
(1) the fact that use of performance enhancing drugs
―threaten the fairness and integrity of the athletic
competition on the playing field[,]‖114 (2) concerns with ―the
adverse health effects of steroid use[,]‖115 and (3) the
overarching concern that ―the use of Prohibited Substances by
NFL players sends the wrong message to young people who
may be tempted to use them.‖116 The NFL procedure applies
to all players, present and future, who have not formally
retired from the NFL.117 Testing of players may occur during
pre-employment, the pre-season, the regular season, or based
on reasonable cause for players with prior positive tests or
108. Id. at 882 (finding two specific sections—‖Masking Agents and Supplements‖
and ―Supplements‖—particularly important in determining whether the players
reasonably relied on a lack of warning that the product taken contained a banned
substance).
109. Id.
110. See Judy Battista, How Good Is the ‘Best’ Drug Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/14/sports/football/14Drugs.html?_r=1.
111. See id.; see also Mike Reiss, NFL Strengthens Drug Policy, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
25,
2007,
http://www.boston.com/sports/articles/2007/01/25/nfl_strengthens_drug_
policy/.
112. See generally NFL POLICY, supra note 4.
113. Id. § 1.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. § 2(A).
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other circumstances.118 The Policy outlines mandatory testing
procedures and sets forth disciplinary procedures for both
failure to comply with the procedures and positive test
results.119 The Policy is one of strict liability: players are
completely responsible for what goes into their bodies and the
league disciplines them accordingly.120 The Policy also sets
forth an arbitration procedure under which any player may
challenge a positive test result or disciplinary action.121 The
Commissioner reviews the arbitration result, and the ensuing
result is binding upon the player.122
B. Minnesota’s State Laws
1. Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace Act
The DATWA sets forth drug testing guidelines which are
to be adopted by private employers.123 Minnesota‘s drug
testing policies have long been among the most restrictive,
setting up strong protective policies for the state‘s resident
employees.124 At the very minimum, under the DATWA, a
written policy must contain:
(1) The employees or job applicants subject to testing under the
policy;
(2) The circumstances under which drug or alcohol testing may be
requested or required;

118. NFL POLICY, supra note 4, § 2(A).
119. A first violation of the Policy results in a minimum suspension of four games
without pay. Id. § 6. If fewer than four games remain, the suspension is carried over
into the next regular season, until the player misses four games. Id. A second violation
of the Policy results in a minimum suspension of eight games without pay. Id. If fewer
than eight games remain, the suspension is carried over into the next regular season,
until the player misses eight games. Id. A third violation of the Policy results in a
minimum suspension of twelve months without pay. Id. After twelve months a player
may petition for reinstatement. Id.
120. Id. § 3(E).
121. See id. § 10.
122. Until the outlined appeals process is completed, any given disciplinary action,
including suspension, will not take effect. Id.
123. See generally MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.950–.957 (2009). Although the statute
was amended in 2010, the version analyzed in this Comment is the pre-2010 version.
124. See V. John Ella, What Do They Have in Mind? Minnesota’s Drug-Testing Law
Turns 20, BENCH & B. MINN., Sept. 2007, at 22–23. The other areas viewed as ―antidrug testing‖ are much of the Northeast and Puerto Rico. Id. In contrast, the Rockies
and the South are generally considered ―pro-drug testing.‖ Id.
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(3) The right of an employee or job applicant to refuse to undergo
drug and alcohol testing and the consequences of refusal;
(4) Any disciplinary or other adverse personnel action that may be
taken based on a confirmatory test or request and pay for a
confirmatory retest; and
(5) Any other appeal procedures available.125

The statute also establishes procedural protections,
requiring employers to test outside of the workplace, and to
have all specimens sent to a licensed, accredited, or certified
laboratory.126 The DATWA places limits on disciplinary
action that may be taken based upon a failed test,127 and
makes allowances for retesting,128 as well as explanations for
a failed test.129 Although the statute outlines minimum
guidelines, it also leaves room for private/collectively
bargained agreements.130 As such, the sections of the statute
―shall not be construed to limit the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement from bargaining and agreeing with
respect to a drug and alcohol testing policy that meets or
exceeds, and does not otherwise conflict with, the minimum
standards and requirements for employee protection provided
in those sections.‖131
2. Consumable Products Act
Minnesota‘s CPA regulates employer conduct respecting
employees‘ nonworking activities.132
This act prohibits
employers from refusing to hire, or disciplining a current
employee, for use of lawful consumable products, if the use of
said products occurs off the premises and during nonworking
hours.133
This law, however, does contain important
exceptions. The CPA explicitly states, in relevant part, that it
is not a violation of the statute ―for an employer to restrict the
use of lawful consumable products by employees during
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

§ 181.952(1)(1)–(5).
§ 181.953.
§ 181.953(10).
§ 181.953(9).
§ 181.953(6)(b).
§ 181.955(1).
Id. (emphasis added).
See generally Id. § 181.938.
§ 181.938(2).
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nonworking hours if the employer‘s restriction: (1) relates to a
bona fide occupational requirement and is reasonably related
to employment activities or responsibilities of a particular
employee or group of employees . . . .‖134
The Minnesota
legislation specifically left room for employers with particular
needs to set greater restrictions regarding testing policies.135
In doing so, the legislature recognized the differences that
exist between different types of employment.136
IV. EIGHTH CIRCUIT ERRS IN DISMISSING ARGUMENT OF
PREEMPTION137
In its holding, the Eighth Circuit erred in two major
respects: (1) not extending the reasoning for preemption of the
state common law claims to the state statutory claims,138 and
(2) taking the narrow approach to section 301 preemption by
ignoring affirmative defenses.139 Both of these errors are
discussed below.

134. § 181.938(3)(a)(1) (emphasis added). In full the CPA notes that it is not a
violation:
(a) [F]or an employer to restrict the use of lawful consumable products by
employees during nonworking hours if the employer‘s restrictions:
(1) relates to a bona fide occupational requirement and is reasonably
related to employment activities or responsibilities of a
particular employee or group of employees; or
(2) is necessary to avoid a conflict of interest or the appearance of a
conflict of interest with any responsibilities owed by the
employee to the employer
(b) [F]or an employer to refuse to hire an applicant or discipline or discharge
an employee who refuses or fails to comply with the conditions
established by a chemical dependency treatment or aftercare program.[…]
(c) [F]or an employer to refuse to hire an applicant or discipline or discharge
an employee on the basis of the applicant‘s or employee‘s past or present
job performance.
§ 181.938(3).
135. See § 181.938(3)(a)(1).
136. See id.
137. On December 14, 2009, the Eighth Circuit denied the NFL‘s motion for a
rehearing en banc. See generally See Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 598 F.3d 932
(8th Cir. 2009). Four judges dissented from the denial, and found fault in the Eighth
Circuit‘s original analysis. See id.
138. See generally Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 566 (2010).
139. See id. at 879 n.13.
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A. Common Law Application to Statutory Claims
According to Williams, section 301 compels preemption of
a state claim where: (1) the CBA creates specific duties such
that the claims can be considered ―based on‖ the agreement,
or (2) resolution of the complaint would necessitate
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.140 The
state common law claims in Williams were preempted
because the court found such interpretation of the CBA
necessary.141 The thread that bound the common law claims
together—and thus allowed them to be preempted—was the
presence of a relationship between the parties and the need to
evaluate that relationship to determine the strength of the
claims by the player-employees.142
The reasoning used to preempt the common law claims can
and should carry over to the statutory claims. The actual
determination of whether an employer has breached its
obligation under the DATWA and CPA is a factual dispute
and the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on the factual nature of
this dispute in disallowing preemption.143 The problem,
however, is that the common law claims which were
preempted, at their essence, are also factual disputes. The
outrageousness
of
conduct,
the
reasonableness
of
expectations, and an employer‘s duty are all factual issues to
be resolved by a fact finder.144 The question of whether the
claim should have been preempted does not sit on the nature
of the issue, be it factual or legal, but rather on the necessity
of interpretation of the CBA, which ultimately existed in this
case.
1. Definition of ―Employer‖
Although the court may have been proper in rejecting the
alternative procedures argument145––because the court can
easily look to what the NFL did, rather than analyze the
actual provisions of the CBA––the court should not have so
140.
141.
142.
II.B.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 881 (citing Bogan v. Gen. Motors Corp, 500 F.3d 828, 832 (8th Cir. 2007)).
See id. at 881–83.
See id. For a full discussion of the state common law claims, see supra Part
See Williams, 582 F.3d at 876.
See id. at 881–83.
For a discussion of the NFL‘s argument, see supra Part II.A.
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quickly discarded preemption founded upon the NFL‘s alleged
status as employer.146
In rejecting the possibility of
preemption, the Eighth Circuit found that defining the NFL‘s
status as employer merely necessitated reference to the
preamble of the CBA, including the term ‗employer‘ and
references to ‗employment,‘ as well as individual employment
contracts.147 If the Williamses had alleged violations of the
CBA, this rationale would prove viable; for purposes of the
agreement, a reference in it would certainly be binding. The
claim, however, was not based upon the CBA, but instead
based on two state statutes, and the Supreme Court has
continuously noted that section 301 preemption is about
resolution of the actual claim.148
In its disposition, the Eighth Circuit seemingly
disregarded state substantive law for determining an
employment relationship. As set forth by Judge Larson on
remand, Minnesota recognizes a five factor test to determine
whether an employer-employee relationship exists for
purposes of state law: ―(1) the right to control the means and
manner of performance; (2) the mode of payment; (3) the
furnishing of materials or tools; (4) the control of the premises
where the work is done; and (5) the right of the employer to
discharge.‖149 Upon remand, the district court, held that the
NFL was in fact the employer for purposes of the DATWA
because of the NFL‘s ―‗sufficient control over the work‘ of [the]
employees[,]‖ as defined through sections of the CBA.150 As
the most important factor to consider being ―the right to
control the means and manner of performance,‖151 Judge
Larson noted not only the control that the NFL had already
146. In his dissent from a denial of a rehearing en banc, Chief Judge Loken also
argued that the NFL‘s employer status depends upon interpretation of the CBA. See
Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 598 F.3d 932, 932 (8th Cir. 2009) (Loken, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Chief Judge Loken does not denote a
statutory or common law basis for his finding, but does importantly note that ―[a]
proper answer requires analysis of the [CBA] between the NFL and the NFLPA, the
NFL Constitution and Bylaws, and the Standard Player Contract between the players
and the Vikings.‖ Id.
147. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 877.
148. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 395 (1987).
149. Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, No. 27-CV-08-29778, at *17 (Minn. 4th D.
May 6, 2010), available at http://www.courts.state.mn.us/Documents/4/Public/News/
Orders/Williamses_v_NFL_Findings_and_Final_Order.pdf (citing Guhlke v. Roberts
Truck Lines, 128 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Minn. 1964)).
150. Id. at *16.
151. Guhlke, 128 N.W.2d at 326 (emphasis added).
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displayed over the players, but also, and more importantly,
the control granted to the NFL through the CBA.152 The
district court looked to the many rights granted through the
CBA in conjunction with one another to determine the totality
of control.153
The court did not merely reference each
individual section of the CBA as it is allowed to do,154 but
actually determined if that section qualifies as indicative of
―the right to control the means and manner of performance,‖
or any other factor of control.155 Such an interpretation as to
the nature of the terms of the CBA by a state court judge
under state law is strictly prohibited where the parties to the
action expressly called for adjudication of the claim by an
arbitrator.156 As such, the NFL‘s status as employer of the
Williamses, for purposes of the DATWA, was and continues to
be ―inextricably intertwined‖157 with the CBA, and thus
should have been preempted under section 301.
2. Bona Fide Occupational Requirements
The CPA, one of the two statutes at issue, says that,
although generally an employer may not fire an employee due
to the use of legal products, off premises, during non-working
hours, such a restriction is allowed if it ―relates to a bona fide
occupational requirement and is reasonably related to
employment activities.‖158
A bona fide occupation
requirement derives from the relationship between the
parties, the factor allowing for preemption of the common law
claims.
For example, a professional athlete physically
competing on the field likely realizes he or she is going to be
tested more stringently for performance enhancing drugs
than a businessperson, because the integrity of the sport is
maintained by making sure that fans are not suspicious of a
game or season‘s outcome. Thus, the NFL‘s drug testing
policy must be interpreted to determine whether a bona fide
152. See Williams, No. 27-CV-08-29778, at *17–23.
153. See id.
154. See Trs. of Twin City Bricklayers Fringe Benefit Funds v. Superior
Waterproofing, Inc., 450 F.3d 324, 330 (2006).
155. Guhlke, 128 N.W.2d at 326.
156. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 404 n.3 (1988) (citing
Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95, 103–04 (1962)).
157. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985).
158. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.938(2)–(3)(a)(1) (2009).
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occupational requirement exists. In the end, the question of
preemption depends largely upon the need for interpretation
of a CBA to resolve a state common or statutory claim.
Although the inquiry about the bona fide occupation
requirement is factual, this point alone cannot prevent
preemption. Similar to the common law claims, all of which
relied on factual determinations correctly preempted by the
Eighth Circuit,159 the statutory claims requiring an analysis of
the bona fide occupation requirement should also be
preempted when their resolution depends upon interpretation
of the CBA, devoid of their factual nature.
B. Section 301 Preemption and Its Effect on Affirmative
Defenses
Noting that the statutes at issue require interpretation of
the Policy, the importance of these statutory clauses depends
greatly upon the role of defenses in issues of preemption. The
jurisprudence regarding the breadth of interpretation under
section 301 is relatively evenly split within the Eighth
Circuit––some cases take a broad approach, while others, a
narrow approach.160 Under the narrow interpretation, a court
may look only to the face of the complaint to determine
whether the claim should be preempted under section 301.161
In taking the narrow approach, the court reasons that the
plaintiff is the master of the complaint, and thus should be
able to plead it in such a manner as to keep the issue in state
court.162 If a very narrow approach to section 301 preemption
doctrine is taken by the courts, then the bona fide
occupational requirement will be seen as a ‗defense‘ and
defenses may not be viewed when determining preemption
issues.
The Eighth Circuit has also taken a broader
163
approach.
That broader view was outlined in Johnson v.
159. See Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 881–83 (8th Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 566 (2010).
160. Compare Bogan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 500 F.3d 828 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding a
narrow approach appropriate), and Meyer v. Schnucks Markets, Inc., 163 F.3d 1048
(8th Cir. 1998) (finding a narrow approach appropriate), with Gore v. TWA, 210 F.3d
944 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding a broad approach appropriate), and Johnson v. Anheuser
Busch, Inc., 876 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding a broad approach appropriate).
161. See Schnucks Markets, 163 F.3d at 1051.
162. See id. at 1050.
163. See generally Gore, 210 F.3d 944; see also generally Anheuser Busch, 876 F.2d.
620.
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Anheuser Busch, Inc.164 Such an approach requires the court
to look beyond the face of the complaint, using anticipated
defenses and other means to determine whether the claim
should be preempted under section 301.165
In finding the narrow approach more appropriate, the
Williams court held that it more closely parallels Supreme
Court precedent.166 The primary problem with the court‘s
reasoning in accepting the narrow approach is that Williams
erroneously applies the principles of removal preemption
where it should have analyzed the principles of ordinary
preemption.167 In holding that it may not view defenses to
determine preemption, the Eighth Circuit relies on
Caterpillar v. Williams.168 Although the Supreme Court in
Caterpillar clearly states that a ―defendant cannot, merely by
injecting a federal question into an action that asserts what is
plainly a state-law claim, transform the action into one
arising under federal law, thereby selecting the forum in
which the claim shall be litigated,‖169 this finding speaks only
to the principle of removal preemption. Critically, removal
preemption speaks not to which court may adjudicate or what
law that court may apply, but only to the whether the claim
may be, when originally brought in state court, removed to
federal court.170
Apart from the removal preemption doctrine, there exists
a separate ordinary preemption doctrine.
Ordinary
preemption is a substantive principle that displaces state law
with federal substantive law, regardless of the venue.171 In
Williams, the NFL did not challenge the venue itself; the
argument set forth by the NFL spoke only to ordinary
preemption. The Supreme Court has correctly recognized the
distinction between the two principles, and allows courts to
164. 876 F.2d at 623.
165. See id. (citing Hanks v. Gen. Motors Corp., 859 F.2d 67, 70 (8th Cir. 1988)).
166. See Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 879 n.13 (8th Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 566 (2010).
167. See Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 598 F.3d 932, 935 (8th Cir. 2009)
(Colloton, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (designating the alternative
forms of preemption as ―ordinary‖ and ―complete‖ preemption).
168. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 879 n.13.
169. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 399 (1987).
170. See Michael C. Harper, Symposium on Labor Arbitration Thirty Years After the
Steel Workers Trilogy: Limiting Section 301 Preemption: Three Cheers for the Trilogy,
Only One for Lingle and Lueck, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 685, 719 (1990).
171. See id.
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look past the face of the complaint in determining ordinary
preemption issues.172 In fact, Caterpillar, the case from which
Williams pulls its support, distinguishes between the two
doctrines noting that ―[t]he fact that a defendant might
ultimately prove that a plaintiff‘s claims are pre-empted
under the NLRA does not establish that they are removable to
federal court.‖173
Earlier, in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., a
case that sets forth the outer barriers of section 301
preemption, the Supreme Court took time to discuss the
purpose and construction of the doctrine of section 301.174 In
footnote three the Supreme Court reiterated:
It was apparently the theory of the Washington court that,
although Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 . . .
requires the federal courts to fashion, from the policy of our
national labor laws, a body of federal law for the enforcement of
[CBAs], nonetheless, the courts of the States remain free to apply
individualized local rules when called upon to enforce such
agreements. This view cannot be accepted. The dimensions of
[section] 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of
federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the
statute . . . .
The possibility that individual contract terms might have different
meanings under state and federal law would inevitably exert a
disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration
of collective agreements. Once the collective bargain was made, the
possibility of conflicting substantive interpretation under
competing legal systems would tend to stimulate and prolong
disputes as to its interpretation. Indeed, the existence of possibly
conflicting legal concepts might substantially impede the parties’
willingness to agree to contract terms providing for final arbitral or
judicial resolution of disputes.
The importance of the area which would be affected by separate
systems of substantive law makes the need for a single body of
federal law particularly compelling . . . . State law which frustrates
the effort of Congress to stimulate the smooth functioning of that
process thus strikes at the very core of federal labor policy. With
due regard to the many factors which bear upon competing state
and federal interests in this area . . . , we cannot but conclude that
in enacting [section] 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal

172. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398.
173. Id.
174. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 404 n.3 (1988)
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labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules.175

The Supreme Court in turn mandated preemption where
―the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the
meaning of a [CBA] . . . .‖176 Resolution of a claim does not
merely depend upon the claim itself, but instead upon
potential defenses. As the heart of section 301 preemption is
to keep any interpretation of a CBA out of the hands of state
judges177—not just interpretation which falls on the face of the
complaint—allowing state courts to interpret these defenses
in applying state substantive law runs counter to the focus of
this doctrine.
Indicative of the impropriety of the Eighth Circuit‘s
decision is the subsequent disposition, by the district court, of
the substantive claim.178 Upon remand, the district court
summarily dismissed the Williamses‘ claim against the NFL
for allegedly violating the CPA, finding a bona fide
occupational requirement existed, the purported defense to
the claim.179 The Williamses should not have been able to
avoid the ―extraordinary preemptive power‖180 of section 301
by cleverly pleading a complaint; especially where a
legitimate defense, necessary to determine the validity of the
claim, turned on an interpretation of the CBA. If the Eighth
Circuit had properly analyzed the Supreme Court precedent,
and focused on Congress‘s intent through section 301, the
defenses would have needed to be examined, and the
statutory claims would have a fortiori been preempted.

175. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. at 103–04).
176. Id. at 405–06 (emphasis added).
177. See Drummonds, supra note 29, at 164.
178. See generally Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, No. 27-CV-08-29778, at *17
(Minn. 4th D. May 6, 2010), available at http://www.courts.state.mn.us/Documents/4/
Public/News/Orders/Williamses_v_NFL_Findings_and_Final_Order.pdf.
179. See id. at *38–39. For a discussion on the interpretation involved in the CPA
claim, see supra Part IV.A.2.
180. Shane v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 1057, 1062 (8th Cir. 1986); see also
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987) (citing Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge
No. 735, 88 S. Ct. 1235, 1236 (1968)).
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V. ARBITRATION AND SECTION 301
The NFL CBA contains a specific grievance procedure for
non-injury based claims by players.181 Article IX of the CBA
outlines the non-injury grievance procedures for the NFL and
calls for appeals from the NFL‘s internal grievance procedure
to go to binding arbitration.182 The type of arbitration
provision called for in the CBA is exactly what Congress
hoped to encourage in promulgating section 301.183 As noted
above, the impetus of section 301 preemption is to create a
common body of law as well as a common forum in which to
resolve labor claims dependent upon interpretation of the
terms of a CBA.184 Because the Eighth Circuit, as well as the
Ninth Circuit,185 continually misapplies section 301, the
courts have slowly eroded the role of arbitrators in labor
cases. Instead, federal judges, and even less appropriately,
state judges have interpreted terms of the CBA—exactly what
section 301 preemption urges against.
Although the NFL did not argue that a valid arbitration
clause was in place, the impropriety of the Eighth Circuit‘s
decision brings to light specific issues of forum waiver in labor
conflicts. The type of provision contained in the NFL CBA
requires binding arbitration only when the claim requires
CBA interpretation.186 Thus, when the Eighth Circuit found
that resolution of the statutory claim did not require the court
to interpret the CBA, the court did not have to send the claim
to arbitration. But, as noted, the statutory claims did in fact
require interpretation of the CBA, and the court should have
sent the claims to arbitration. In order to reestablish the role
of arbitration, unions and employers should be able to
collectively bargain for binding arbitration of statutory
claims.187 The ability, however, to bargain for such a forum
181. See NFL MGMT COUNCIL & NFL PLAYERS ASS‘N, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT 2006–2012, Art. IX, 23–27 (Mar. 8, 2006), http://images.nflplayers.com/
mediaResources/files/PDFs/General/NFL%20COLLECTIVE%20BARGAINING%20AGR
EEMENT%202006%20-%202012.pdf [hereinafter NFL CBA].
182. See id.
183. See supra Part I.B.3.
184. See supra Part I.B.3 and accompanying text.
185. See generally Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001)
(finding defenses irrelevant in determining questions of section 301 preemption).
186. See NFL CBA, supra note 181, at Art. IX, Sec. 1.
187. As noted above, see supra notes 65–68, section 203(d) of the LMRA calls for use
of the forum decided upon by the parties involved. The problem is section 203(d) only
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waiver, depends
arbitration.

upon

the

jurisprudence

surrounding

A. Enforceability of Arbitration Provisions in Collective
Bargaining Agreements
In 1920, the Supreme Court decided three cases
(collectively known as ―The Steelworker‘s Trilogy‖) that
established the federal policy in favor of arbitration as the
forum for resolution of labor disputes.188 In deciding the
Steelworker‘s Trilogy, the Court turned a firm stance, and
recognized that, unless an arbitrator‘s award does not draw
its essence from the CBA, then a court must uphold the
arbitrator‘s award.189
These decisions recognized the
importance of arbitration and generally called for the
enforceability of arbitration clauses.
Even with the federal policy favoring arbitration, until
recently, it seemed as though there was little hope for
unionized parties seeking to arbitrate statutory claims. While
the Supreme Court extended the scope of arbitration clauses,
the Court still feared the differing interests of individual
employees and their representative unions and disallowed
union waiver of an individual employee‘s judicial forum of
statutory claims.190
Then, in 2009, the Supreme Court outlined an exception to
the general rule of non-waiver. In 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, the
Supreme Court recognized that unions could waive the
judicial forum in favor of arbitration for federal
antidiscrimination claims.191 Pyett involved the Realty
Advisory Board on Labor Relations (―RAB‖) and the Service
comes into play when a court finds the claims preempted by section 301. See Joshua A.
Reece, Note, Throwing the Red Flag on the Commissioner: How Independent
Arbitrators Can Fit into the NFL’s Off-Field Discipline Procedures Under the NFL
Collective Bargaining Agreement, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 359, 367 n.46 (2010). Allowing
parties to collectively bargain for a forum waiver clause will avoid the judicial forum
altogether; parties will go directly to arbitration.
188. See generally United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigating Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
189. See generally Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564; Warrior & Gulf Navigating Co., 363
U.S. 574; Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593.
190. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding that an
employee does not lose the judicial forum after a claim goes through an arbitral
proceeding).
191. 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
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Employees International Union, Local 32BJ (―Union‖)
entering into an industry-wide CBA requiring union members
to submit all employment discrimination claims, including
those under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), to binding arbitration.192 14 Penn Plaza, a member
of the RAB, owned the building where respondents worked. 193
Temco Service Industries, Inc., respondents‘ direct employer,
reassigned respondent‘s jobs after 14 Penn Plaza hired
Spartan Security.194 The Union filed grievances alleging
various violations of the CBA.195 After withdrawing the agediscrimination claims from arbitration, the respondents
alleged a violation of the ADEA in the district court.196 The
petitioners sought to compel arbitration based on the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).197 The district court denied the
motion, and the Second Circuit affirmed.198
The Supreme Court then reversed and remanded the
decision, holding that ―there is no legal basis for the Court to
strike down the arbitration clause in this CBA, which was
freely negotiated by the Union and the RAB, and which
clearly and unmistakably requires respondents to arbitrate
the age-discrimination claims at issue . . . .‖199 In coming to
this conclusion, and allowing for waiver of the judicial forum
through a CBA, the Court recognized that unions—as
exclusive bargaining agents for employees—should be able to
negotiate for arbitration, as arbitration clauses are a
condition of employment, and thus a mandatory subject of
bargaining.200 In allowing for such a waiver, the Court also
noted that individual employees would not lose their
discrimination claims in arbitration, but instead just lose the
judicial forum itself.201 The Supreme Court also recognized
that bargaining parties must ―clearly and unmistakably‖
waive the statutory claim in the arbitration provision in order
to make it enforceable;202 however, the Court in Pyett refused
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See id. at 1461.
See id.
See id. at 1461–62.
See id. at 1462.
See id.
See 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1462.
See id. at 1462–63.
Id. at 1466.
See id. at 1463–64.
See id. at 1469.
Id. at 1473–74.
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to analyze what constitutes clear and unmistakable waiver.203
Thus, lower courts are still free to interpret what ―clearly and
unmistakably‖ entails.
B. Extending the Decision in Pyett to the Waiver of State
Statutory Claims
The Supreme Court‘s decision in Pyett—which was limited
to waiver of federal ADEA claims—can, and should be
extended in order to further effectuate the policies behind
section 301. Cases analyzing arbitration clauses have become
more accepting of the use of arbitration as a forum for
resolution of claims.204 The Pyett decision relies upon a
number of cases, which use the FAA,205 as a statutory basis
for waiver of the judicial forum.206 Although labor arbitration
derives from a different source than the FAA, the Supreme
Court has acknowledged that the FAA applies to almost all
contracts of employment.207 As such, the FAA can and should
203. See 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1473–74.
204. Originally, the Supreme Court did not allow waiver of the judicial forum for
federal statutory claims. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (disallowing waiver of
the judicial forum for claims brought under the Securities Act). Despite initial
resistance to forum waiver, the Supreme Court later overruled the holding in Wilko,
and held that courts should presume federal statutory claims are arbitrable. See
generally Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985).
205. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006)
206. See generally 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (relying upon, e.g., Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), and Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) to allow for union waiver of
the judicial forum).
207. Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). The FAA, first enacted in 1925,
applies to ―any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce.‖ § 2. Section 1 of the FAA further defines commerce by stating:
‗[C]ommerce‘, as herein defined, means commerce among the several States or
with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District
of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any such
Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia
and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing herein contained
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
§ 1. (emphasis added). Because of the exempting language contained in section 1,
courts spent many years trying to determine the limits of the FAA exemption of
employment contracts. In 2001 the Supreme Court finally answered that question.
The Court in Circuit City v. Adams, held that section 1 of the FAA only applies to
transportation employment contracts; all other employment contracts are subject to the
provisions of the FAA. 532 U.S. 105. This means that most arbitration clauses
contained in employment contracts are in fact enforceable under the FAA.
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continue to provide a basis for waiver of state statutory
claims. The jurisprudence of the FAA currently allows for
arbitration of state statutory claims.208 The Supreme Court
has even recognized that the FAA preempts state statutes
that discriminate against arbitration clauses.209 In fact, even
if a contract has a state choice of law provision, courts will
uphold arbitration provisions unless the parties specifically
call for the choice of law provision to apply to arbitration. 210
Allowing for a waiver of state statutory claims is a natural
extension of the arbitration jurisprudence already in place.
The Minnesota statutes at issue in Williams do not contain
any provisions disallowing arbitration of the statutory
claim.211 As such, unions should be able to waive the judicial
forum in favor of arbitration for state statutory claims,
specifically drug testing statutes. Because the Supreme
Court did not specifically define clear and unmistakable
waiver, a reasonable interpretation would be one that puts all
parties represented on notice of which statutory provisions
are waived. The NFL and NFLPA, for example, could state—
in the CBA—that ―The NFL agrees to comply with all state
statutory drug testing provisions, present or hereafter
enacted, to the extent it is legally required to do so. Any and
all claims arising under those provisions shall be subject to
the grievance and arbitration procedures provided herein as
the sole and exclusive remedy for violations. Arbitrators shall
apply any and all appropriate law in rendering decisions
based on these claims.‖ After including such language, the
CBA could cross-reference to the Policy, where it could include
a non-exhaustive list of such drug testing provisions. Such
language would provide appropriate notice to all members of
the NFLPA that their representative union waived the
judicial forum, favoring instead arbitration of drug testing
statutory claims.
208. See generally Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (calling for arbitration of
all claims agreed to under state law, including a state statutory claim).
209. See generally Doctor‘s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1995) (holding
that a first page notice requirement applicable only to arbitration clauses is
inconsistent with the FAA and is therefore displaced).
210. See generally Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52
(1995) (finding that the choice of law provision intended to only incorporate ―New
York‘s substantive rights and obligations, and not the state‘s allocation of power
between tribunals‖).
211. See generally MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.950–.957 (2009); see generally also id. §
181.938.
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Such waiver also allows arbitrators to be the ones to apply
section 301 in determining the underlying claim.
As
arbitrators in labor cases are quite familiar with what
―interpretation‖ of a CBA actually entails, these individuals
are more likely to properly enforce section 301 preemption
and use a broad approach, taking defenses into account.
Again, by waiving the statutory forum, individuals will not
lose their substantive claim; instead, they simply agree to a
specific forum to resolve their claims, a forum that the
Supreme Court has affirmatively recognized as an acceptable
forum for the resolution of statutory claims.
CONCLUSION
Drug testing has become a topic at the forefront of the
sports industry. Concerns with the effects that drug use has
on the players, the integrity of the sports leagues, and the
potential trickle-down effect on America‘s youth has caused
leagues to institute stringent strict liability standards and
respectively strong discipline. The Eighth Circuit in Williams
v. National Football League did not defer to these collectively
bargained for agreements, and instead allowed for players to
take state action. By failing to extend the reasoning of the
common law claims to the statutory claims and
misinterpreting Supreme Court precedent, the Eighth Circuit
has placed professional sports leagues in a position of fear of
litigation.
Both leagues and players, through their respective player‘s
associations, should be able to reach an agreement regarding
drug testing terms, place them in a collectively bargained for
agreement, and then subsequently rely on these procedures
and discipline. The NFL followed the intent of Congress,
strengthened drug testing policies and in return, it was sued.
Section 301 is intended to deal with such cases, and in order
for the intent of Congress to be fully realized, professional
sports leagues must be able to continue collectively
bargaining for drug testing policies without fear of potential
state litigation.
Although it does not resolve the issue of improper
application of section 301 preemption, allowing unions and
employers to waive the judicial forum in favor of arbitration
can act as a first step towards the fulfillment of congressional
intent in labor adjudication. Arbitrators have experience
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interpreting CBAs; they know when interpretation of the CBA
is necessary to the resolution of a statutory claim, and thus
are likely to properly apply section 301. Even in instances in
which the arbitrator follows a narrow approach—which is
contrary to the substantive law of section 301—having the
arbitrator be the one to decide follows the congressional
intent regarding forum of adjudication. Until the Supreme
Court resolves the split among the circuits regarding section
301 preemption, allowing arbitrators to resolve the entire
statutory claim, as well as preemption issues, encourages
proper adjudication of claims pursuant to section 301 of the
LMRA.

